Melanie's Law

"Melanie's Law" was enacted into law in late 2005. Its purpose is to enhance the penalties for drivers convicted of Operating a motor vehicle Under the Influence (OUI) of alcohol or drugs. Massachusetts OUI penalties have some of the steepest maximum fines in the country.  Repeat Offenders could end up with enormous fines. Failure to take the breathalyzer test could result in a driver's license suspension of 180 days to 3 years. Please remember that Massachusetts now has a lifetime look-back for all prior OUI convictions, this is different than the previous ten year look back period.


Here are the current laws if you are convicted of OUI or agree to a plea bargain prior to trial:
     
     First Offense                   

• Fine: $500 to $5,000
• Jail: No minimum to 2.5 years
• Driver's license suspension: one year

Drivers arrested for a first OUI offense can get their sentences reduced by agreeing to complete a state-approved alcohol education program. This is not an option after the first offense.

Second Offense

• Fine: $600 to $10,000
• Jail: 30 days to 2.5 years
• Driver's license suspension: two years

Third Offense (felony)

• Fine: $1,000 to $15,000
• Jail: 150 days to five years
• Suspension: eight years

Fourth Offense (felony)

• Fine: $1,500 to $25,000
• Jail: one to five years
• Suspension: 10 years

Fifth Offense (felony)

• Fine: $20,000 to $50,000
• Jail: two to five years
• Suspension: lifetime

Here are the current penalties for refusing to take the breathalyzer test:

• First Offense: Automatic 180 Day Suspension 
• Second Offense (or an offender who is under 21): 3 Years License Loss 
• Third Offense: 5 Years
• Fourth Offense: 10 Years 
• Fifth Offense: Life, prior offenses are subject to a lifetime look back provision and including any prior OUI or drunk driving history. 
 *If you refuse to take the breathalyzer it is an automatic 180 day loss of license versus 30 Days if you Take and then Fail the test by Blowing .08 or above   

If you have been arrested for OUI in Massachusetts, contact Attorney Gomes immediately at (617) 265-2700 x106.

MA SJC Rules Judge Cannot Order Defendant To Wear GPS In Certain Circumstances

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rules that a judge cannot order a Defendant who is on probation to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet where no violation of probation has been found, and there is no material change in the Defendant's circumstance.-Attorney Gomes (tgomeslaw.com)

NOTICE: The slip opinions and orders posted on this Web site are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. This preliminary material will be removed from the Web site once the advance sheets of the Official Reports are published. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us




COMMONWEALTH vs. Ralph W. GOODWIN.



No. SJC-10647.



April 7, 2010. - September 17, 2010.
Global Positioning System Device. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation, Revocation of probation.Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy.

CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on November 17, 2009.

The case was reported by Botsford, J.

Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney (Deborah Bercovitch, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Jeannine E. Mercure with her) for the defendant.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Cordy, Botsford, & Gants, JJ.

GANTS, J.

Acting on a petition for relief brought by the Commonwealth under G.L. c. 211, § 3, a single justice of this court reserved and reported the question "whether a judge has the authority to impose a global positioning system (GPS) monitoring device as an additional condition of probation in a probation modification proceeding" where there was no finding of a violation of a condition of probation. We conclude that, unless a judge finds a violation of a condition of probation, a judge does not have the discretion to impose GPS monitoring as an additional condition of probation where there is no material change in the defendant's circumstances and where GPS monitoring, paired with geographic exclusions, is so punitive as to increase significantly the severity of the original probationary terms. Therefore, the judge was correct to deny the Commonwealth's request to modify the conditions of the defendant's probation to add GPS monitoring and geographic exclusion zones.

MA Appeals Court Reverses Drug Conviction Based on 6th Amendment

The Appeals Court of Massachusetts reverses the Defendants drug convicition on the basis that his Sixth Amendment right was violated when the Commonwealth introduced a drug certificate into evidence which stated that the substance involved was actually drugs. This case continues a long line of cases that began with the case of Melendez-Diaz, reversing drug convictions where the chemist or some other expert did not testify that the substance involved was actually a drug.-Attorney Gomes (tgomeslaw.com)

NOTICE: The slip opinions and orders posted on this Web site are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. This preliminary material will be removed from the Web site once the advance sheets of the Official Reports are published. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us





COMMONWEALTH vs. Marcus PIXLEY.




No. 07-P-1976.




May 17, 2010. - September 9, 2010.
Constitutional Law, Self-incrimination, Confrontation of witnesses. Witness, Privilege, Self-incrimination. Controlled Substances. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis. Words, "Secondary school."

INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2005. The cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J.

Jane E. Ross for the defendant.

Andrew R. Thomson (Joseph M. Ditkoff, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.

Present: Cypher, Meade, & Milkey, JJ.

MEADE, J.

A jury convicted the defendant of distribution of cocaine in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(c ), and for doing so in a school zone in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32J. In a separate bench trial, the defendant was also convicted and sentenced for being a habitual criminal in violation of G.L. c. 279, § 25, and for second offense distribution in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(d ).

[FN1]

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the judge erred in holding an in camera hearing to determine the validity of a defense witness's claim of a Fifth Amendment privilege under the United States Constitution, (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that University High School was a secondary school, (3) testimony regarding money used to purchase narcotics should have been excluded because the money itself was not in evidence, (4) the admission of the drug analysis certificate without testimony from the analyst violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and (5) that the judge erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on the school zone charge. We reverse.

MA SJC Allows Motion to Suppress in Case Involving Anonymous Caller

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts allowed the defendant's motion to suppress in this drug case due to the fact that the information received from an anonymous caller was not sufficient to search the vehicle occupied by the Defendant. I was actually the original attorney in district court that argued the motion to suppress. Please read the decision below. 
-Attorney Gomes (tgomeslaw.com)456 Mass. 385 (2010)

COMMONWEALTH
v.
MARTEL MUBDI.

SJC-10552.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.December 7, 2009.March 29, 2010.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

Christopher L. Maclachlan for the defendant.

386*386 Kathleen Celio, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

GANTS, J.

The defendant was charged in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department with possession of marijuana, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34; possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a); and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school or public park, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.^[1] The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, including the marijuana he is charged with possessing, seized by Boston police officers on May 16, 2007, from a parked vehicle during an investigatory stop. After an evidentiary hearing, a judge denied the motion to suppress, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop and that the protective sweep of the vehicle in which the defendant had been seated was reasonable to protect the safety of the police officers and appropriately limited in scope. A single justice of this court granted the defendant leave to file an interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court from the denial of the motion. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).

The Appeals Court issued an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, affirming the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, but on grounds different from the motion judge. Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 1110 (2009). The Appeals Court concluded that the information that prompted the investigatory stop fell short of reasonable suspicion, but held that the defendant's motion to suppress should still have been denied because, in the affidavit he filed under Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004), he failed to assert that he had an expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which the police located the challenged evidence and, at the evidentiary hearing, he failed to establish his reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review. We now reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.

MA Appeals Court rules search of Defendant's home illegal

The Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled the search of a Defendant's apartment illegal due to the fact that the police were unable to show any connection between two to three drug transactions committed by the Defendant on one particular day and the Defendant's apartment. Please read the decision below.
-Attorney Gomes tgomeslaw.com


NOTICE: The slip opinions and orders posted on this Web site are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. This preliminary material will be removed from the Web site once the advance sheets of the Official Reports are published. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us







COMMONWEALTH vs. Joshua A. BOOKMAN.






No. 09-P-604.






June 14, 2010. - September 1, 2010.
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, Confrontation of witnesses. Search and Seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis.

INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 25, 2006.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Paul A. Chernoff, J., and the cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J.

Patricia Quintilian for the defendant.

Susanne R. Bines, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Green, Dreben, & Milkey, JJ.

DREBEN, J.

After being indicted on numerous charges, the defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine, committing that violation in a school zone, and of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal, he claims (1) the motion judge erred in not granting his motion to suppress drugs found in a residential apartment (a) because the police lacked probable cause to believe that cocaine and related paraphernalia would be found there, and (b) because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of the apartment; (2) that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find hehad constructive possession of the cocaine within the apartment; and (3) the admission of the drug certificates was in violation of his rights under the confrontation clause.

1. Motion to suppress. We take our facts from the findings of the motion judge, supplemented by uncontradicted evidence from the hearing on the motion. On March 17, 2006, a confidential informant told the Somerville police department that an individual named John Holbrook would be participating in a drug transaction near a certain café and that a Ford Explorer with Massachusetts license plate TC7451 would be involved. Police went to the named café where they saw Holbrook, known to them as a drug user, leaving the Ford Explorer which then drove away. When approached by police, Holbrook, although at first cooperating with the police, named the seller as Josh and then as George, and gave them two bags of cocaine, soon ceased to cooperate and was arrested.